
24:44
I love how cheery Terri is when introducing the call

24:51
Please review ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior here: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/expected-standards-2016-06-28-en.

26:52
Were we anticipating this document from the GAC? (I haven't had a chance to dive into it. have had my hand full trying to digest the new auctions proposal)

28:19
@Jim: I think someone mentioned it last week.

28:35
That's right - Jorge sent an email. Thanks

30:28
Helpful Jeff, thank you.

30:59
And the GAC did of course indicate that they were going to do their best to get us input in a 'side by side way to our topics at this stage of our deliberations this is a first (all be it detailed) go at this. for our use

31:03
Jorge flagged it and it was mentioned in the communique

31:49
+1 Cheryl. thanks

40:33
What was the harm? Was the harm ICANN didn't get the money? It got millions and is sitting on most of it (except for the part they raided to pay for the Obama spinoff.

41:14
The harm is that single applicants got beat by portfolio applicants with money earned by losing other strings.

42:12
I agree with Jeff - the focus on ICANN now is much different than it was prior to the 2012 round.

42:50
not in all instances. one applicant could opt for auction of last resort and all money went to ICANN

43:02
I think there should be a general absolute priority for single applicants.

45:01
I have seen no studies indicating that there will be more/less reputational harm by ICANN stockpiling even more millions of dollars in its auctions by banning private auctions.

45:52
Sorry to be late -- US Supreme Court's Booking.com oral argument just finished.

50:57
Draconian. Includes a Registry Death Penalty and Applicant Death Penalty..

53:25
We need to be careful not to scare off potential new entrants by making the rules complicated.

54:25
The resulting processes would be complicated.

55:49
lost paul

56:00
I can hear Paul

56:01
I was hearing Paul

56:08
i never lost Paul

56:19
neither did I

57:26
may have been a Zoom phone audio issue as that's what I am dialed in on

57:39
The alternative to auction is the beauty pageant model, with all the issues that come with it.

58:46
What I "only" bid $100,000,000 which would just require a $10,000,000 deposit. I'd still win most/all of these.

59:03
I don't think that's what is proposed. I think bids are sent once evals and contentions sets are done

59:15
Hence auction ALWAYS favours deep-pocketed applicants.

59:37
@Donna, it means that an applicant new to ICANN would spend hundreds of thousands of dollars getting an application in only to be out bidded in a non-transparent process.

59:52
Why wouldn't the big company win the TLD anyway? How would a live auction prevent that?

01:00:38
Jim, I understood it to resolve contention set first and do evaluation and objection only on the winner.

01:00:49
Differently from 2012.

01:01:48
Full bid amounts in deposit gets rid of small applicants entirely. Happy to speak to that if you like Jeff.

01:04:41
Option 1 is inherently unfair and biased towards those with a big 'slush fund'.

01:07:55
Agree with Paul.

01:08:41
A reminder of the "multiplier" in bidding for applicants in need; this should not be lost.

01:10:03
@Justine, has a criteria been agreed for "applicants in need".

01:10:40
We need to solve the "giant guy always wins" problem, the "blind Brand" problem, and the Death Penalty problem.

01:10:50
@Donna, applicants that have obtained Applicant Support has been suggested.

01:11:08
@Justine, perhaps it should be broader.

01:11:12
Paul, does the proposal solve those if we change the penalty from death to $$

01:11:19
@Donna, indeed!

01:12:37
The flow chart created by Jessica Hooper is available here: https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/gnso-newgtld-wg/attachments/20191205/f0f90133/SecondPriceSealedBidVickeryAuctionModel-ForSubProPDPDiscussion-0001.pdf

01:12:45
(as mentioned by Jeff)

01:13:07
Yah the proposal allows for the most amount of info at bidding

01:13:15
@Elaine - depends on the $ amount. You can kill nearly any registry with a big enough monetary penalty.

01:13:35
Correct

01:15:10
giant guy always wins

01:18:04
@Paul I would have thought that's a good reason for applicants to not bid some ridiculous amount.

01:18:32
Did smth like that that ever happened - applicants joining forces?

01:19:02
Were is the JV/creativity mentioned in this strawman?

01:19:12
3 bullet in T&Cs

01:19:23
@Paul: See bullet 1, sub-bullet 3

01:20:04
So creativity is in the warning section?

01:20:20
Yikes

01:20:39
That's just formatting.

01:20:39
We need to build out an entire section on JV and other creative solutions

01:21:11
@Paul, that’s what consultants are for ;)

01:22:24
I think the AGB includes and encourages creative ways to resolve contention prior to the auction of last resort.

01:22:30
@Elaine, I think we can buld it now- everything else is being built.

01:22:35
@Donna: that's a nice idea.

01:22:36
Interesting question @Donna

01:22:44
So we may not need to repeat again in the T&Cs warning..

01:23:31
At-Large asked for consideration for an applicant which gets Applicant Support to get priority in a contention set.

01:23:57
We are not getting that far with only rehashing the old conversations, so something new is good!

01:24:26
A business model analysis is pretty much a beauty pageant.

01:25:25
we should severely limit the number of applications that any applicant can make .

01:25:36
I'm concerned that we're losing sight of the intent of the program, which is to increase competition and innovation. New entrants in a contention set might need a leg up.

01:26:24
A multiplyer of the largest number of applications in the contention set divided by your number?

01:26:35
I recall there was concern during previous discussions regarding the business model analysis and that these would be subjective.

01:27:06
Have we already discussed the option 2 (of 2)?

01:27:51
@Jeff, promise? ;) just kidding

01:28:27
There were also discussions to help minimise contention sets whereby applicants could amend the string under strict circumstances

01:28:59
To Jeff's last point, we still need to find a solution to a situation where there is not a new entrant in the contention set.

01:29:57
if emphasis is on innovation, then why not prioritize those applications in the contention set that show a clear path to innovation and not just standard operations

01:30:04
noted @Donna

01:30:26
old hand sorry

01:30:42
Innovation can be good or bad, as the TLDs hit with TM-PDDRP have shown.

01:30:43
@Jamie - some may not want to reveal the extent of their innovations at that stage as it could, from a competitive standpoint

01:31:13
@Martin, it's hard - one can't have it both ways.

01:31:43
@Justine - agree, that’s why discussions and ideas have been extensive

01:32:03
@Martin, sure, we agree on that.

01:32:03
Actually, the financial evaluation as described in the draft report does not ask for a business model evaluation.

01:34:55
can see option 2?

01:35:11
Pauls “blind brand” problem

01:35:14
That would still exclude other forms of resolution.

01:35:16
@ Rubens - Then it should.

01:35:20
Interesting idea Donna. Might help deal with the Blind Brand problem

01:35:22
In option 2, by the time a sealed bid is put in, you know how many applicants are there in the contention set.

01:36:18
Blind brands - The TM holder would get some ro

01:36:37
Priority by the evaluators

01:37:38
can we both options

01:37:52
can we see both options?

01:38:08
Sorry to be late, hi everyone

01:38:50
@Donna, can you pull back the sealed bid at any time and revert back to 2012 Auction?

01:39:24
on the screen...

01:39:34
tx!!

01:39:50
Lost audio Jeff

01:39:56
Your back

01:39:58
Jeff’s audio is back

01:40:09
My preference from day one has been for option 1 but in the spirit of compromise, I could get my head around option 2. Its not ideal for the reasons Donna point out.

01:40:14
To clarify, with all the proposals, there isn't room for JVs and like? Or applicants in contention sets are expected to consider a JV with parties whose identity are withheld?

01:40:31
@Paul, I believe pulling back from the sealed bid would put the 2nd bid as winner, not to cause an auction of last resort.

01:40:55
Option 2 does.

01:40:56
So option 2 with Ts and Cs, for no private auction? Is that what Donna just suggested/

01:40:57
@Jeff, I don't think we are at the "live with" stage yet. We still need to build out JV/creative section first,

01:41:15
I cannot live with Option 1.

01:41:43
+1 Donna. Option 1 is no good. Option 2 might be, depending on how its fully built out.

01:41:45
FYI, the allowance for joint ventures is actually discussed in greater detail in the Applicant Change Requests section.

01:41:55
Option 2 with T&Cs and not private auctions sound good.

01:43:12
@Steve, correct, then Option 1 is not a viable consideration, given the "developments" in the Application Change Request section.

01:44:09
Without revealing applicant identifies

01:44:16
*identities

01:44:53
Ah ok, so less opportunity for “collusion"

01:47:12
Perhaps establishing a time limit for the bids ? Like they expire after a year and each one still interested in the string has to update the bid.

01:47:58
seems like there is growing support for Option 2 with T&Cs and no private auctions so now we need to flesh it out some more.

01:48:26
We can at least work to try to perfect Option 2, but Option 1 seems like a non-starter. Option 1 just guarantees ICANN gets even more $ to sit on.

01:49:40
Pull out

01:49:56
I don't think there's anything that would compel them to continue down a path.

01:50:26
the new proposal is preferable to Option 2—you have more info at time of bidding, and profiteering is prohibited

01:50:33
+1 Jim

01:51:49
So a party could be paid to withdraw. And parties can negotiate agreements as to who is withdrawing on which competing application, i.e. horse trading will work in some cases, right?

01:51:51
ok, that works.

01:51:58
so if there is a delay, material change of circumstances you have another sealed bid ?

01:52:31
we can scroll down to the new proposal

01:52:44
can we

01:52:53
thanks

01:53:14
Sounds like we might be listing prohibitions?

01:53:26
Or what is permissible?

01:53:28
One of the issues raised with Option 2 is that the contention set composition may be impacted by String Confusion objections.

01:54:42
Yes, @jeff

01:54:44
We are past the 90 minutes... Perhaps ask for comments on the list.

01:54:57
this meeting is scheduled for 120 mins

01:55:08
@Alan - we are scheduled for 120 mins today

01:56:08
agree

01:56:16
@Jeff, thanks!

01:56:21
Sorry, on my calendar the text said 120 but the meeting length was 90.

01:57:08
which option is Option 2? Your new proposal?

01:57:10
can't hear

01:57:17
Apologies if there was an error on the staff side, Alan

01:57:18
Jeff, your audio is fading out

01:57:22
audio

01:57:26
is faded out

01:57:29
@Jeff, your audio is low. Can you move closer to the mic?

01:57:38
back

01:57:39
Audio seems to be back to normal

01:58:37
I think that Donna has a good point.

01:59:02
Option 2, timing of bid should precede reveal.

01:59:21
Preferences:

01:59:50
1. Full evaluation of all with pdriorities

02:00:02
2. Option 2 as amemded

02:00:15
3. Option 1 excluded.

02:00:23
Bidders should know the number of competitors, where there are community or geo applications in the set, and the name collision risk result.

02:00:43
@Donna - thanks. Lots to think about.

02:00:45
but they wouldn't know the identities of the bidders?

02:01:12
Agree completely with Donna and Justine; timing should be before reveal.

02:01:37
Unless applicants decide to go public with their applications

02:02:17
Priorities should include Single applicants; ASP

02:02:24
What's the last problem?

02:02:31
Elaine, yes. There should be no non-disclosure obligations, but ICANN wouldn't be able to validate a claim from an applicant that an application was submitted.

02:02:37
blind bids give smaller applicants a chance to win since they cant get snuffed out by portfolios or big platforms

02:02:42
Alexander Schubert has rejoined

02:02:45
Communities, TM+Brand,

02:03:02
If you have a string confusion objection and the contention set gets changed later where someone didn't have to submit a bid, but now has to

02:03:18
Or .niledelta community application.

02:04:53
I don't see that as a problem.

02:05:28
last time shop & shopping

02:05:50
.kid and .kids too

02:06:26
Yes Thanks @Donna

02:06:31
That’s a reasonable solution

02:06:52
makes sense

02:07:31
I believe this is option 1...

02:07:42
Because it's inherently unfair and biased towards those with a lot of resources.

02:08:35
good idea , Alexander . do we actually need a reveal day ???

02:08:55
Not only portfolio applicants. Even a single-string applicant might bid differently knowing how many there are.

02:09:42
Alexander the problem with submitting a bid with the application is you are asking applicants (of all sizes) to disclose sensitive commercial information unnecessarily

02:09:49
@Alex, how would that not disadvantage single applicants, applicants in need in forcing them to place a deposit for their bid?

02:11:46
I agree that having to submit a (potentially very large) bid at application time is problematic.

02:12:01
How can you know what a string is worth? For a brand. it truly depends on whether or not there is a risk that a bad actor would end up with it. Option 1 is completely unhelpful. Option 2, modified, might be a path forward, depending on how it ends up.

02:12:44
+1 Paul

02:12:52
ASP might be financially-challenged, but that's not always the case of single-string applicants.

02:13:01
Some could be, some not.

02:13:45
that's true Rubens, but a single-string applicant will add competition to the pool of registries

02:14:58
great idea, we definitely want that option

02:15:30
getting all to withdraw is too steep a baseline for that option to be useful

02:15:42
Thx Jeff

02:16:34
Apologies, I have to drop early. Good discussions and ideas.

02:16:35
interesting use cases, thx everyone

02:17:08
I can think of a number of ways to include a bidder or bidders in an application "in name only" and essentially pay them to become "silent partners". How could we police that activity? Very commonly we can say that X key individual from the other party or parties are becoming Board members or Advisory Board members or whatever. Then you pay them but you are actually paying them to withdraw their application.

02:19:30
Yes, @Donna, it's hard to properly consider this auctions topic without thinking about the ramifications of Application Change Requests.

02:20:53
@Alexander, what you said still doesn't absolve applicants from the burden of having to "pre-arrange" deposit for bid.

02:20:56
If so, that is less horrible

02:21:28
@Jeff, will Staff capture our progress and resend around an updated strawman.

02:21:33
I agree with Paul: more work to be done here.

02:21:40
In the case of sealed bids there is no need for deposits.

02:22:09
If that applicant doesn't pay the full bid at contracting, the process restarts with the 2nd largest bid.

02:22:54
+1 Alan

02:23:02
The ($185,000) application fee is the deposit.

02:23:09
Lots of great discussion today! But More work to be done on this large and often complex topic... Thanks everyone... Bye for now

02:23:11
Interesting Alan!!

02:23:20
It is normal to take a deposit to participate in an auction

02:23:44
Is it?

02:24:03
No pay, no play. :)

02:24:21
What time on Thursday?

02:24:23
will you recirculate everything?

02:24:38
my auction experience is limited obviously

02:24:43
For an ascending auction it's usual to have deposit, but that's not the case for sealed bids.

02:24:45
Justine and I both had suggested edits to Paul's proposal

02:25:17
New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Working Group call on Thursday, 07 May 2020 at 03:00 UTC for 90 minutes.

02:25:19
Great, tx!

02:25:43
Bye